WARREN
MR.
CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.
These
cases come to us from the States of Kansas, South Carolina,
Virginia, and Delaware. They are premised on different facts
and different local conditions, but a common legal question
justifies their consideration together in this consolidated
opinion.
In
each of the cases, minors of the Negro race, through their
legal representatives, seek the aid of the courts in obtaining
admission to the public schools of their community on a nonsegregated
basis. In each instance, they had been denied admission to
schools attended by white children under laws requiring or
permitting segregation according to race. This segregation
was alleged to deprive the plaintiffs of the equal protection
of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. In each of the
cases other than the Delaware case, a three-judge federal
district court denied relief to the plaintiffs on the so-called
"separate but equal" doctrine announced by this
Court in Plessy v. Fergson, 163 U.S. 537. Under that
doctrine, equality of treatment is accorded when the races
are provided substantially equal facilities, even though these
facilities be separate. In the Delaware case, the Supreme
Court of Delaware adhered to that doctrine, but ordered that
the plaintiffs be admitted to the white schools because of
their superiority to the Negro schools.
The
plaintiffs contend that segregated public schools are not
"equal" and cannot be made "equal," and
that hence they are deprived of the equal protection of the
laws. Because of the obvious importance of the question presented,
the Court took jurisdiction. Argument was heard in the 1952
Term, and reargument was heard this Term on certain questions
propounded by the Court.
Reargument
was largely devoted to the circumstances surrounding the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. It covered exhaustively
consideration of the Amendment in Congress, ratification by
the states, then-existing practices in racial segregation,
and the views of proponents and opponents of the Amendment.
This discussion and our own investigation convince us that,
although these sources cast some light, it is not enough to
resolve the problem with which we are faced. At best, they
are inconclusive. The most avid proponents of the post-War
Amendments undoubtedly intended them to remove all legal distinctions
among "all persons born or naturalized in the United
States." Their opponents, just as certainly, were antagonistic
to both the letter and the spirit of the Amendments and wished
them to have the most limited effect. What others in Congress
and the state legislatures had in mind cannot be determined
with any degree of certainty.
An
additional reason for the inconclusive nature of the Amendment's
history with respect to segregated schools is the status of
public education at that time. In the South, the movement
toward free common schools, supported by general taxation,
had not yet taken hold. Education of white children was largely
in the hands of private groups. Education of Negroes was almost
nonexistent, and practically all of the race were illiterate.
In fact, any education of Negroes was forbidden by law in
some states. Today, in contrast, many Negroes have achieved
outstanding success in the arts and sciences, as well as in
the business and professional world. It is true that public
school education at the time of the Amendment had advanced
further in the North, but the effect of the Amendment on Northern
States was generally ignored in the congressional debates.
Even in the North, the conditions of public education did
not approximate those existing today. The curriculum was usually
rudimentary; ungraded schools were common in rural areas;
the school term was but three months a year in many states,
and compulsory school attendance was virtually unknown. As
a consequence, it is not surprising that there should be so
little in the history of the Fourteenth Amendment relating
to its intended effect on public education.
In
the first cases in this Court construing the Fourteenth Amendment,
decided shortly after its adoption, the Court interpreted
it as proscribing all state-imposed discriminations against
the Negro race. The doctrine of "separate but equal"
did not make its appearance in this Court until 1896 in the
case of Plessy v. Ferguson, supra, involving not education
but transportation. American courts have since labored with
the doctrine for over half a century. In this Court, there
have been six cases involving the "separate but equal"
doctrine in the field of public education. In Cumming v.
County Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528, and Gong Lum
v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, the validity of the doctrine itself
was not challenged. In more recent cases, all on the graduate
school level, inequality was found in that specific benefits
enjoyed by white students were denied to Negro students of
the same educational qualifications. Missouri ex rel. Gaines
v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337; Sipuel v. Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631;
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629; McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents, 339 U.S. 637. In none of these cases was it necessary
to reexamine the doctrine to grant relief to the Negro plaintiff.
And in Sweatt v. Painter, supra, the Court expressly
reserved decision on the question whether Plessy v. Ferguson
should be held inapplicable to public education.
In
the instant cases, that question is directly presented. Here,
unlike Sweatt v. Painter, there are findings below
that the Negro and white schools involved have been equalized,
or are being equalized, with respect to buildings, curricula,
qualifications and salaries of teachers, and other "tangible"
factors. Our decision, therefore, cannot turn on merely a
comparison of these tangible factors in the Negro and white
schools involved in each of the cases. We must look instead
to the effect of segregation itself on public education.
In
approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to
1868, when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896, when
Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public
education in the light of its full development and its present
place in American life throughout the Nation. Only in this
way can it be determined if segregation in public schools
deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.
Today,
education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and
the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our
recognition of the importance of education to our democratic
society. It is required in the performance of our most basic
public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces.
It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is
a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural
values, in preparing him for later professional training,
and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably
be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity
of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available
to all on equal terms.
We
come then to the question presented: Does segregation of children
in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though
the physical facilities and other "tangible" factors
may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of
equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does.
In
Sweatt v. Painter, supra, in finding that a segregated law
school for Negroes could not provide them equal educational
opportunities, this Court relied in large part on "those
qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but
which make for greatness in a law school." In McLaurin
v. Oklahoma State Regents, supra, the Court, in requiring
that a Negro admitted to a white graduate school be treated
like all other students, again resorted to intangible considerations:
". . . his ability to study, to engage in discussions
and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to
learn his profession." Such considerations apply with
added force to children in grade and high schools. To separate
them from others of similar age and qualifications solely
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as
to their status in the community that may affect their hearts
and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. The effect
of this separation on their educational opportunities was
well stated by a finding in the Kansas case by a court which
nevertheless felt compelled to rule against the Negro plaintiffs:
Segregation
of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental
effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when
it has the sanction of the law, for the policy of separating
the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority
of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation
of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law,
therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and
mental development of negro children and to deprive them of
some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated
school system.
Whatever
may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the
time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported
by modern authority. Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson
contrary to this finding is rejected.
We
conclude that, in the field of public education, the doctrine
of "separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational
facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that
the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the
actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation
complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. This disposition makes
unnecessary any discussion whether such segregation also violates
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Because
these are class actions, because of the wide applicability
of this decision, and because of the great variety of local
conditions, the formulation of decrees in these cases presents
problems of considerable complexity. On reargument, the consideration
of appropriate relief was necessarily subordinated to the
primary question -- the constitutionality of segregation in
public education. We have now announced that such segregation
is a denial of the equal protection of the laws. In order
that we may have the full assistance of the parties in formulating
decrees, the cases will be restored to the docket, and the
parties are requested to present further argument on Questions
4 and 5 previously propounded by the Court for the reargument
this Term The Attorney General of the United States is again
invited to participate. The Attorneys General of the states
requiring or permitting segregation in public education will
also be permitted to appear as amici curiae upon request to
do so by September 15, 1954, and submission of briefs by October
1, 1954.
It
is so ordered.
*
Together with No. 2, Briggs et al. v. Elliott et al.,
on appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of South Carolina, argued December 9-10, 1952, reargued
December 7-8, 1953; No. 4, Davis et al. v. County School
Board of Prince Edward County, Virginia, et al., on appeal
from the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia, argued December 10, 1952, reargued December 7-8,
1953, and No. 10, Gebhart et al. v. Belton et al.,
on certiorari to the Supreme Court of Delaware, argued December
11, 1952, reargued December 9, 1953.
